Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

Oct. 26 (13:30-14:30) room C.714 

Christopher Stapenhurst (Budapest University of Technology and Economics)

Title: Efficient, fair and stable agreements for marine plastic pollution 

Abstract: We study the design of international agreements to abate marine plastic pollution (UNEP 2022). First, we use data of 120 countries from across the globe to derive an efficient abatement policy that maximises collective welfare. Second, we find that the efficient policy is both unfair (poor countries bear the costs whilst rich countries reap the benefits) and unstable (some countries would be better off without it). We therefore construct compensation schemes that produce efficient, fair and stable (E-FAST) agreements. Third, we test the robustness of the model with empirical cost data. 

The talk is based on joint work with Sreoshi Banerjee. 

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