Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

December 10 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) Dávid Csercsik  (ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Hungary) Auction-based allocation of routes in capacity-constrained networks We study the route-set allocation problem between end nodes Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

December 3 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) Zexiao Wu (Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi’an, China) Capacity modification for matching with couples: An integer programming and computational study We study capacity modification in the Hospitals/Residents problem with Couples, in which Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

November 12 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) Helga Habis (Corvinus University of Budapest) Why stochastic bankruptcy rules may fail in river sharing under uncertainty Transboundary river basins are characterized by water scarcity, uncertainty, and limited enforceability of Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

November 5 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) János Flesch (Maastricht University, The Netherlands) Decision problems with rare interventions We consider infinite-horizon decision problems in which the decision maker loses control at randomly selected stages. We model this Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

October 15 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) Christopher Stapenhurst (Brandenburg University of Technology, Germany) Relative performance pay under multiplicative common shocks, with an application to farmland bird conservation Results-based payments for ecosystem services can resolve adverse selection Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

October 1 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) Mánuel Mágó (Corvinus University of Budapest) Uncertain participation We introduce participation uncertainty to the theory of cooperative TU-games. Under participation uncertainty, each coalition’s effective value is an expected value taken Continue Reading …