Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

November 12 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) Helga Habis (Corvinus University of Budapest) Why stochastic bankruptcy rules may fail in river sharing under uncertainty Transboundary river basins are characterized by water scarcity, uncertainty, and limited enforceability of Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

November 5 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) János Flesch (Maastricht University, The Netherlands) Decision problems with rare interventions We consider infinite-horizon decision problems in which the decision maker loses control at randomly selected stages. We model this Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

October 15 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) Christopher Stapenhurst (Brandenburg University of Technology, Germany) Relative performance pay under multiplicative common shocks, with an application to farmland bird conservation Results-based payments for ecosystem services can resolve adverse selection Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

October 1 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) Mánuel Mágó (Corvinus University of Budapest) Uncertain participation We introduce participation uncertainty to the theory of cooperative TU-games. Under participation uncertainty, each coalition’s effective value is an expected value taken Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

June 4 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) Sudipta Sarangi (Virginia Tech, USA) Influence Competition in Networks We study strategic influence competition between two actors: an influencer, who can shape interaction patterns and directly influence agents, and a Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

May 14 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room C.510 (new building, 5th floor) Szilvia Pápai (Concordia University, Canada) Pareto-Efficient Matching with Gradual Acceptances We introduce the class of Gradual Acceptance matching rules, which assign objects to agents through a gradual procedure in which Continue Reading …