CIAS invites you to the next talk of the Corvinus Game Theory Seminar.
Oct. 19 (13:30-14:30) room C.714
Héctor Hermida Rivera (Budapest University of Technology and Economics)
Title: Stable voting rules
Abstract: In this paper, I characterise stable voting rules and self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) in three equilibrium notions for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let voters’ preferences over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null voter and swing voter. I then provide a binary notion of stability that can be used with any equilibrium concept, and show that the families of stable voting rules and self-stable constitutions are fairly small. Consequently, I provide some mathematical foundations for the ‘paradox of tolerance’ and ‘Gödel’s loophole’. In doing so, I conclude that political parties are often key to the self-stability of otherwise not self-stable constitutions.