Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

April 16 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room C.510 (new building, 5th floor) Dávid Csercsik (ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest) A model-based analysis of the AggregateEU mechanism AggregateEU is a new centralised mechanism that provides a no-commitment platform to trade Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

April 2 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room C.510 (new building, 5th floor) Gergely Csáji (Eötvös Lóránd University, Budapest) Clustering via hedonic games: New concepts and algorithms We study fundamental connections between coalition formation games and clustering, illustrating the cross-disciplinary relevance of these Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

March 19 (Thursday) 10:15-11:15, room C.510 (new building, 5th floor) Tamás Fleiner (Budapest University of Technology and Economics) Yet another proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem One of the fundamental results of social choice theory is Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which states Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

February 26 (Thursday) (10:00-11:00) room C.510 (new building, 5th floor) Ákos Balázs (Corvinus University of Budapest) Generalised solution concepts in games without expected utility We propose a general framework for strategic interaction that relaxes the expected utility assumption and instead Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

February 19 (Thursday) (10:00-11:00) room C.510 (new building, 5th floor) Emil Horobeț (Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania) The geometry of higher-order modern portfolio theory In this talk, we present a generalized modern portfolio theory with utility functions admitting higher-order cumulants. Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

December 4 (Wednesday) (10:00-11:00) room C.510 (new building, 5th floor) Pinaki Mandal (Budapest University of Technology and Economics) Equivalence between individual and group strategy-proofness under stability When policymakers implement mechanisms in real-world institutions, they often prefer strategy-proof mechanisms over manipulable Continue Reading …