November 26 (Thursday) 10:00-11:00, room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor)
Helmuts Azacis (Corvinus University of Budapest)
Second-best implementation in a repeated duopoly
A competition authority (CA) wants to maximize total surplus in a repeated duopoly. Production costs change over time and are known by the firms but not by the CA. The CA chooses a time-invariant output schedule that must be implemented in every equilibrium, with zero equilibrium transfers. We characterize the optimal schedule as a function of the firms’ discount factor. Competitive output is implementable when firms are sufficiently impatient. Otherwise, the optimal schedule separately pools low-cost and high-cost states and prescribes decreasing output at intermediate costs, possibly coinciding with monopoly output over an interval. We construct a sequence of mechanisms that implements this schedule. In the limit as firms become arbitrarily patient, the solution coincides with that of a static monopoly regulation problem without transfers.