Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

Apr. 3 (10:00-11:00) room C.510 Zsuzsanna Jankó (Corvinus) Stable matchings and distributive lattices It is a classic result that the set of one-to-one stable matchings form a distributive lattice. We generalize this to many-to-many matchings with substitutable and IRC choice functions, and Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

Mar. 20 (10:00-11:00) room C.510 Héctor Hermida Rivera (QSMS, Budapest University of Technology) Self-equivalent voting rules In this paper, I introduce a novel stability axiom for stochastic voting rules—called self-equivalence—by which a society considering whether to replace its voting rule Continue Reading …

Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

Mar. 13 (10:00-11:00) room C.510 Helmuts Azacis (Cardiff University, UK, and Corvinus) Unmediated communication in games with (in)complete information: the 4-player case We show that every rational correlated equilibrium of any finite game with complete information and four players can Continue Reading …