October 9 (10:00-11:00) room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor)
Surajit Borkotokey (Dibrugarh University, India)
Cooperative games with a-priori links
This paper proposes a new framework for cooperative games where players possess pre-existing network connections. We integrate this network structure directly into the coalition formation process, moving beyond traditional graph-restricted models. Within this setup, we first derive the Shapley value, which arises when imposing a classical symmetry condition. Recognizing that pre-existing links often break this symmetry, we introduce a new Link Proportional value. This solution allocates payouts based on a player’s number of connections to other coalition members, a concept formalized by our new Link Proportionality axiom. We provide full axiomatic characterizations for both values. The model is applicable to modern problems, such as allocating revenue among networked digital content creators, where our proposed value offers a fair and strategically robust allocation.
Keywords: TU games; Shapley value; Link Proportional value; Characterization; Networks.