CIAS invites you to the next talk of the Corvinus Game Theory Seminar.
Oct. 12 2023, 13:30-14:30 online:
Péter Bayer (Toulouse School of Economics)
Title: Evolutionarily stable networks
Abstract: This paper studies the Darwinian evolution of behavior governing strategic network formation. I first propose a general framework of evolutionary selection in non-cooperative games played in heterogeneous groups under assortative matching. Evolution selects strategies that (i) execute altruistic actions towards others in the interaction group with rate of altruism equal to the rate of assortative matching and (ii) are stable against coalitional deviations accounting for possible discoordination where the probability of coordination again equals the rate of assortativity. I then restrict the domain of interaction games to strategic network formation and define evolutionarily stable networks, combining the solution concepts of evolutionary game theory and network formation games. I showcase the distinct properties of evolutionary stable networks in two applications, a communication game and the classic co-author game.