Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

The next talk in the CGTS will be on 6 October, at 14:00 in room C510

Speaker: Arseniy Samsonov (QSMS — Budapest University of Technology and Economics).

TitleBargaining over information design (co-authored with Kemal Kivanç Aköz) 

Abstract A group of Senders is persuading a Receiver to choose a better action for its members. There is a conflict of interest among the Senders. The setting corresponds to scenarios in which parties campaign against a joint political opponent, minority groups advocate for their rights, or competing firms lobby the regulator. We follow a Bayesian persuasion approach to analyze communication. First, we consider a situation in which there is a set of Receiver’s beliefs such that, given each belief, a fixed number of Senders gain compared to the status quo while others lose, and every subgroup of Senders of this number can win. In this situation, there is a persuasion protocol that, in expectation, benefits all Senders relative to the status quo. Next, we impose symmetry assumptions and characterize a persuasion protocol corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution. 

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