Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

CIAS invites you to the next talk of the Corvinus Game Theory Seminar.

Apr. 20 (12-13)  room C.714

Xin Ye (Durham University, UK) 

Computing Balanced Solutions for Large International Kidney Exchange Scheme

To overcome incompatibility issues, kidney patients may swap their donors. In international kidney exchange programmes (IKEPs), countries merge their national patient-donor pools. We consider a recently introduced credit system. In each round, countries are given an initial “fair” allocation of the total number of kidney transplants. This allocation is adjusted by a credit function yielding a target allocation. The goal is to find a solution that approaches the target allocation as closely as possible, to ensure long-term stability of the international pool. As solutions, we use maximum matchings that lexicographically minimize the country deviations from the target allocation. We first introduce a novel approach for incorporating credits that has not been proposed in the literature before. Namely, let the solution concepts prescribe a set of target allocations for a credit-adjusted game, where the credits are incorporated into the value function of the game directly.  We perform a computational study for a large number of countries, up to fifteen countries. For the initial allocations, we consider the tau value and Banzhaf value. We compare our new results with previously obtained results for the benefit value, contribution value, Shapley value and nucleolus. Our experiments show that using lexicographically minimal maximum matchings instead of ones that only minimize the largest deviation from the target allocation (as previously done) may make an IKEP up to 54% more balanced.  

The talk is based on joint work with Márton Benedek, Péter Biró and Daniel Paulusma. 

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