Mar. 27 (10:00-11:00) room C.510
Pierre von Mouche (Wageningen University, NL, and Corvinus)
On Cournot oligopolies with a biconcave price function
The power of a recent result for Nash equilibria of sum-aggregative games [1] is illustrated by providing a variant of Ewerhart’s equilibrium uniqueness theorem for Cournot oligopolies with a biconcave essential price function [2]. This variant, contrary to the original result, allows for at 0 discontinuous industry revenue and can be considered as a major generalisation of the classical uniqueness result of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi for rent-seeking games [3].
Literature:
[1] von Mouche, P. H. M. and Szidarovszky, F., Aggregative Games with Discontinuous Payoffs at the Origin, Mathematical Social Sciences, 129, 77–84, 2024.
[2] Ewerhart, C., Cournot Games with Biconcave Demand, Games and Economic Behavior, 85, 37–47, 2014.
[3] Szidarovszky, F. and Okuguchi, K., On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 18, 135–140, 1997.