We invite you to the next talk in the seminar.
Time: March 9 (Thursday) 12:00-13:00 (Budapest time, GMT+1)
Place: C.714 (the 7th floor can be accessed from any floor except the ground floor via the side elevator or the staircase)
Leanne Streekstra (BME QSMS)
On the timing of moves in two-player games
We analyze two-player continuous time dynamic games in which agents decide when (or whether) to move, and what action to implement. Players can move at most once. For a class of games in which at least one agent has a strategic second-mover advantage, we show that in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium agents move sequentially. We identify the characteristics that determine which agent leads. Examples from price and electoral competition, where we adapt familiar static and two-stage games, illustrate the strength of our modelling approach.
The talk is based on joint work with Larry Karp, Robert Schmidt and Leo Simon.