Corvinus Center For Operations Research
Corvinus University of Budapest
November 20 (10:00-11:00) room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) Miklós Pintér (Corvinus University) Consistent Beliefs without Common Prior In a strand of the literature, it is assumed that the common prior has full support; that is, every type of every Continue Reading …
November 13 (10:00-11:00) room C.510 (new building, 5th floor) Tom Demeulemeester (University of Lausanne, Switzerland) Pairwise efficiency and monotonicity imply Pareto efficiency in (probabilistic) object allocation We consider object allocation problems with capacities (see, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1998; Basteck, Continue Reading …
November 6 (10:00-11:00) room C.510 (new building, 5th floor) Gergely Kiss (Corvinus University) Quasi-arithmetic means, quasi-sums, and bisymmetry with and without regularity assumption Bisymmetry equation first appears in works of János Aczél, where it gains importance in the characterization of quasi-arithmetic Continue Reading …
October 9 (10:00-11:00) room E.118.2 (main building, 1st floor) Surajit Borkotokey (Dibrugarh University, India) Cooperative games with a-priori links This paper proposes a new framework for cooperative games where players possess pre-existing network connections. We integrate this network structure directly Continue Reading …
October 2 (10:00-11:00) room C.510 Péter Harta (University of Pannonia, Hungary) Crossing the Threshold from Selfishness to Collective Cooperation The process of self-organization of heterogeneous individuals is important, as their team structure – formed by their self-organizing process – shapes Continue Reading …
September 4 (10:00-11:00) room C.510 Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University, Germany) Incomplete Information and Matching of Likes: A Mechanism Design Approach We employ a mechanism design approach and study the implementability of stable matchings in a two sided market model with Continue Reading …
May 22 (10:00-11:00) room C.510 David Bartl (Silesian University in Opava, Czechia) Farkas’ lemma and linear programming in the infinite case We consider the linear programming problem in the setting of a general vector space over a linearly ordered (commutative Continue Reading …
May 15 (10:00-11:00) room C.510 Zsófia Dornai (HUN-REN Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of Economics, Game Theory Research Group) TU-games with utility functions: dually u-essential coalitions and other characterization sets for the u-prenucleolus The u-prenucleolus is a generalization of Continue Reading …
May 8 (10:00-11:00) room C.510 Christopher Stapenhurst (QSMS, Budapest University of Technology) Red or Gold? Clausen and Stapenhurst (2024) obtain a lower bound on the cost of the optimal static, bribe-proof mechanism. But what about dynamic mechanisms? We propose a Continue Reading …
Apr. 16 (Wednesday) 11:40-12:40, room E.218 (main building) Humberto Moreira (FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finança) Auction design using value prediction with hallucinations We investigate a Bayesian mechanism design problem where a seller seeks to maximize revenue by selling an Continue Reading …