{"id":945,"date":"2025-04-30T20:53:31","date_gmt":"2025-04-30T20:53:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=945"},"modified":"2025-04-30T20:53:31","modified_gmt":"2025-04-30T20:53:31","slug":"corvinus-game-theory-seminar-42","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=945","title":{"rendered":"Corvinus Game Theory Seminar"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>May 8 (10:00-11:00) room C.510<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><strong><strong><strong>Christopher Stapenhurst<\/strong> <\/strong><\/strong><\/strong>(QSMS, Budapest University of Technology)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><strong>Red or Gold?<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Clausen and Stapenhurst (2024) obtain a lower bound on the cost of the optimal static, bribe-proof mechanism. But what about dynamic mechanisms? We propose a mechanism called &#8220;Red and Gold&#8221; that uses a nuisance action to deter bribes at arbitrarily small cost. The agent receives either a red or a gold ticket. If the monitor reports shirking then she is asked to guess the colour of the agent&#8217;s ticket. If the monitor&#8217;s guess is correct, then she receives an arbitrarily small reward, and the agent receives a large fine. Otherwise, the agent gets no fine. It follows that any equilibrium belief of the monitor leaves exactly one of the agent&#8217;s types better off rejecting bribes. But then the monitor can perfectly infer the agent&#8217;s type, so the type that rejects bribes would be better off accepting them. Hence there can be no bribes in equilibrium. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The talk is based on joint work with Andrew Clausen and John Moore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>May 8 (10:00-11:00) room C.510 Christopher Stapenhurst (QSMS, Budapest University of Technology) Red or Gold? Clausen and Stapenhurst (2024) obtain a lower bound on the cost of the optimal static, bribe-proof mechanism. But what about dynamic mechanisms? We propose a <span class=\"readmore\"><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=945\">Continue Reading &#8230;<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-945","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/945","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=945"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/945\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":946,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/945\/revisions\/946"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=945"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=945"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=945"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}