{"id":929,"date":"2025-04-07T07:16:01","date_gmt":"2025-04-07T07:16:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=929"},"modified":"2025-04-07T07:16:02","modified_gmt":"2025-04-07T07:16:02","slug":"corvinus-game-theory-seminar-and-research-seminar-of-institute-of-economics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=929","title":{"rendered":"Corvinus Game Theory Seminar and Research Seminar of Institute of Economics"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Apr. 16 <strong>(Wednesday) 11:40-12:40, room E.218 (main building)<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><strong><strong><strong>Humberto Moreira<\/strong> <\/strong><\/strong><\/strong>(FGV\/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finan\u00e7a)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Auction design using value prediction with\u00a0hallucinations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We investigate a Bayesian mechanism design problem where a seller seeks to maximize revenue by selling an indivisible good to one of n buyers, incorporating potentially unreliable predictions (signals) of buyers\u2019 private values derived from a machine learning model. We propose a framework where these signals are sometimes reflective of buyers\u2019 true valuations but other times are hallucinations, which are uncorrelated with the buyers\u2019 true valuations. Our main contribution is a characterization of the optimal auction under this framework. Our characterization establishes a near-decomposition of how to treat types above and below the signal. For the one buyer case, the seller\u2019s optimal strategy is to post one of three fairly intuitive prices depending on the signal, which we call the \u201cignore\u201d, \u201cfollow\u201d and \u201ccap\u201d actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tha talk is based on joint work with Ilan Lobel (NYU Stern School of Business) and Omar Mouchtaki (NYU Stern School of Business).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Apr. 16 (Wednesday) 11:40-12:40, room E.218 (main building) Humberto Moreira (FGV\/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finan\u00e7a) Auction design using value prediction with\u00a0hallucinations We investigate a Bayesian mechanism design problem where a seller seeks to maximize revenue by selling an <span class=\"readmore\"><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=929\">Continue Reading &#8230;<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":6,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-929","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/929","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/6"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=929"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/929\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":930,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/929\/revisions\/930"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=929"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=929"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=929"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}