{"id":447,"date":"2024-02-26T19:14:20","date_gmt":"2024-02-26T19:14:20","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=447"},"modified":"2024-02-26T19:14:20","modified_gmt":"2024-02-26T19:14:20","slug":"corvinus-game-theory-seminar-18","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=447","title":{"rendered":"Corvinus Game Theory Seminar"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Feb. 29 (14:00-15:00) room C.714\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Sreoshi Banerjee\u00a0<\/strong>(Budapest University of Technology and Economics)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Title: <strong>On identifying efficient, fair and stable allocations in \u201dgeneralized\u201d sequencing games<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Abstract: We model sequencing problems as coalitional games and study the Shapley value and the non-emptiness of the core. The \u201doptimistic\u201d cost of a coalition is its minimum waiting cost when the members are served first in an order. The \u201dpessimistic\u201d cost of a coalition is its minimum waiting cost when the members are served last. We take the weighted average of the two extremes and define the class of \u201dweighted optimistic pessimistic (WOP)\u201d cost games. If the weight is zero, we get the optimistic scenario and if it is one, we get the pessimistic scenario. We find a necessary and sufficient condition on the associated weights for the core to be non-empty. We also find a necessary and sufficient condition on these weights for the Shapley value to be an allocation in the core. We impose \u201dupper bounds\u201d to protect agents against arbitrarily high disuilities from waiting. If an agent\u2019s disutility level is his Shapley payoff from the WOP cost game, we find necessary and sufficient conditions on the upper bounds for the Shapley value to conform to them.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Feb. 29 (14:00-15:00) room C.714\u00a0 Sreoshi Banerjee\u00a0(Budapest University of Technology and Economics) Title: On identifying efficient, fair and stable allocations in \u201dgeneralized\u201d sequencing games Abstract: We model sequencing problems as coalitional games and study the Shapley value and the non-emptiness <span class=\"readmore\"><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=447\">Continue Reading &#8230;<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-447","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/447","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=447"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/447\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":448,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/447\/revisions\/448"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=447"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=447"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=447"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}