{"id":225,"date":"2023-10-09T06:39:12","date_gmt":"2023-10-09T06:39:12","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=225"},"modified":"2023-10-09T06:39:12","modified_gmt":"2023-10-09T06:39:12","slug":"corvinus-game-theory-seminar-15","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=225","title":{"rendered":"Corvinus Game Theory Seminar"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">CIAS invites you to the next talk of the\u00a0Corvinus Game Theory Seminar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Oct. 19 (13:30-14:30) room C.714&nbsp;<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>H\u00e9ctor Hermida Rivera&nbsp;<\/strong>(Budapest University of Technology and Economics)&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Title: <strong>Stable voting rules\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Abstract: In this paper, I characterise stable voting rules and self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) in three equilibrium notions for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let voters\u2019 preferences over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null voter and swing voter. I then provide a binary notion of stability that can be used with any equilibrium concept, and show that the families of stable voting rules and self-stable constitutions are fairly small. Consequently, I provide some mathematical foundations for the \u2018paradox of tolerance\u2019 and \u2018G\u00f6del\u2019s loophole\u2019. In doing so, I conclude that political parties are often key to the self-stability of otherwise not self-stable constitutions.\u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>CIAS invites you to the next talk of the\u00a0Corvinus Game Theory Seminar. Oct. 19 (13:30-14:30) room C.714&nbsp; H\u00e9ctor Hermida Rivera&nbsp;(Budapest University of Technology and Economics)&nbsp; Title: Stable voting rules\u00a0 Abstract: In this paper, I characterise stable voting rules and self-stable <span class=\"readmore\"><a href=\"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/?p=225\">Continue Reading &#8230;<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-225","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/225","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=225"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/225\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":226,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/225\/revisions\/226"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=225"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=225"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.ccor.hu\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=225"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}