Corvinus Game Theory Seminar

Tenev’s talk in the CGTS will be on 20 October, at 14:00 in room C706

Speaker: Anastas Tenev (Corvinus University of Budapest).

Title: Information Design for Weighted Voting 

(co-authored with Toygar T. Kerman) 

Abstract We consider a sender who wishes to persuade multiple receivers to vote in favor of a proposal and sends them correlated messages that are conditional on the true state of the world. The receivers share a common prior, wish to implement the outcome that matches the true state and have homogeneous preferences, but are heterogeneous in their voting weights. Given a weight profile, an optimal signal can be represented by a tractable linear programming problem. We employ insights from cooperative game theory and interpret the voting problem as a simple game to analyze optimal communication for various voting situations. While public communication is optimal under weak, oligarchic, or dictatorial games, the sender can significantly benefit from private communication under symmetric, strong, or non-weak proper games.

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