The Corvinus Center for Operation Research (CCOR) invites you to the workshop: Information, Games and Decisions (IGD)

**Venue:** Corvinus University, Building C, Room: C.714**Date:** May 31 Wednesday, 10.30-14.30

**Keynote speaker:** Dov Samet (Tel-Aviv University)

**Speakers**: Péter Vida (Corvinus & CY Paris Cergy University)

Miklós Pintér (Corvinus)

**Program:**

10.30-11.00: Péter Vida: *Simple Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games *

11.00-11.30: Miklós Pintér: Continuous Generalized Games

11.30-12.30: Lunch break

12.30-13.30: Dov Samet: *Desirability relations in Savage’s model of decision making*

13.30-14.30: Discussion

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**Abstracts**

** Dov Samet: Desirability relations in Savage’s model of decision making** (joint with David Schmeidler)

We propose a model of an agent’s probability and utility that is a compromise between Savage (1954) and Jeffrey (1965). In Savage’s model the probability-utility pair is associated with preferences over acts which are assignments of consequences to states. The probability is defined on the state space, and the utility function on consequences. Jeffrey’s model has no consequences, and both probability and utility are defined on the same set of propositions. The probability-utility pair is associated with a desirability relation on propositions. Like Savage we assume a set of consequences and a state space. However, we assume that states are comprehensive, that is, each state describes a consequence, as in Aumann (1987). Like Jeffrey, we assume that the agent has a preference relation, which we call desirability, over events, which by definition involves uncertainty about consequences.

** Péter Vida: Simple Forward Induction in Monotonic Multi-Sender Signaling Games** (joint with Takakazu Honryo and Helmuts Azacis)

We introduce a new solution concept called simple forward induction which is implied by strategic stability in generic finite multi-sender signaling games. We apply this notion to infinite monotonic signaling games and show that a unique pure simple forward induction equilibrium exists and its outcome is necessarily non-distorted. Finally, we show that in this class of games the non-distorted equilibrium outcomes are limits of stable outcomes of finite games.

** Miklós Pintér: Continuous Generalized Games** (joint with Imre Balog)

We consider finite stochastic games and examine the existence of equilibrium for finite stochastic games. Our goal is to use a new concept – continuous generalized game – in order to provide a different proof of the existence for equilibrium of finite generalized discounted stochastic games. In our proof, we show that all mentioned stochastic games are continuous generalized game and then we show that they have an equilibrium.